To Livy, a Roman historian living at the end of the 1st Century BCE, it would have been impossible to deny the weight of fortune that had, in a few hundred years, propelled Rome to ascendency in the Mediterranean. The Romans were hegemons over the successors of Alexander, the marauding Gauls, and all other manners of people who had, at one point, been masters of the known world. Roman power thus colors Livy’s response to the question of whether Alexander could defeat the Romans: the former, a mythic figure of a people now humbled, while the latter was an unstoppable force. Living in his time, who could imagine Roman defeat?
Are Livy’s arguments credibile? He believed that Alexander was only one great king in whom the Macedonians had invested all their spirit, while Rome had innumberable generals to match his valor and personal glories.1 Livy also wrote on the logistical and manpower problems that any invading Macedonian army would face.2 Livy finally pivoted toward a discussion of each side’s power under arms, insulting the capability of Alexander’s eastern contingents while emphasizing Roman tactical flexibility.3 These three arguments can be summed up as command, logistical, and tactical.
One may argue that because Alexander’s empire fell apart at his death, his vulnerability during a Macedonian campaign would give the advantage to Rome, whose wars were never lost at the death of a commander. This belief however begs the question: would the chaos at Alexander’s death in peacetime be the same if he died during an Italian invasion? In other words, there’s little evidence to show if a common enemy would unite successor generals to promote a smooth transition of power, so it is wrong to assume either way.
Livy estimated Roman manpower at the end of the Samnite wars to be 250,000, because it could field 10 armies simultaneously against various threats on the Peninsula.4 Another adantage to Roman logistics was its relatively flexible definition of citizenship.5 This allowed the state in this period to draw upon greater manpower reserves than other contemporary powers.6 At the same time, Alexander would have to launch a fleet to carry his army from Greece to Italy, a notoriously dangerous passage.7 Livy’s argument about the logistical advantage going to Rome is correct.
Finally, we analyze the relative quality of these armies. The Romans would have just fought the Second Samnite War (326-304 BCE), leaving behind a veteran army in the process of reforming its organization.8 Alexander would at the same time lead a veteran army of world-conquering hoplites. Still, Livy claimed that Alexander’s veteran advantage would not be enough to overcome a newly reformed Roman army of Hastati, Pricipes, and Trarii. Pyrrhus of Epirus bested this Roman army on multiple occassions.9 The lesson of the Pyrrhic War, however, was that veteran armies were worn down and ultimately overcome by the weight of Roman numbers.10 The quality of an individual soldier may not be as important as Livy emphasized, but his assessment of Roman logistical organization is key to understanding its superiority. Alexander consistently drew upon local recruits to reinforce his armies in the east, but by the end of the 4th century BCE, it would be near impossible to bring consistent reinforcements in the hundreds of thousands from Iran to Italy.
It is impossible to determine how the quality of leadership would swing a contest of arms. It would also be wrong to assume how alliances between Greeks and Italians would pan out without a comprehensive assessment of individual and state motives in a geopolitical situation that doesn’t exist. Ultimately, we must pit the logistical abilities against the tactical. Roman organizational superiority would eventually surpass any advantage held by a Macedonian veteran army, but we still cannot definitively say how each state would reform its army, economy, or training in a protracted conflict.
Advantage, Rome. Sort of.
Sources:
- Livy’s Counterfactual History: the Alexander Digression (9.16-19)
- Livy’s Counterfactual History: the Alexander Digression (9.16-19)
- Livy’s Counterfactual History: the Alexander Digression (9.16-19)
- Livy’s Counterfactual History: the Alexander Digression (9.16-19)
- Robin Lane Fox, The Classical World, An Epic History from Homer to Hadrian, 91-92
- Plutarch, Age of Alexander, Pyrrhus of Epirus, 15-25
- Plutarch, Age of Alexander, Pyrrhus, 15-25
- Livy’s Counterfactual History: the Alexander Digression (9.16-19)
- Plutarch, Age of Alexander, Pyrrhus, 15-25 & Robin Lane Fox, The Classical World, An Epic History from Homer to Hadrian, 230-232
- Plutarch, Age of Alexander, Pyrrhus, 15-25
Alexander to Caesar, The Rise of Rome 