Be yourself; Everyone else is already taken.
— Oscar Wilde.
This is the first post on my new blog. I’m just getting this new blog going, so stay tuned for more. Subscribe below to get notified when I post new updates.
Be yourself; Everyone else is already taken.
— Oscar Wilde.
This is the first post on my new blog. I’m just getting this new blog going, so stay tuned for more. Subscribe below to get notified when I post new updates.

Polybius sought to understand what led the Roman Republic to conquer most civilizations surrounding the Mediterranean sea within a single lifetime. Economic organization, constitutional government, contemporary geopolitics, and luck all had their role in Roman conquest. Still, below, we explore Roman values to understand its unique culture of public ambition better.1 The most significant values which motivated those within the aristocracy (nobilitas) to conquer were as follows: courage or manliness (virtus), ambition for public recognition and glory, and ancestor worship. The synthesis of these could be one explanation for the unprecedented success of Rome’s victories in the 2nd century BCE.
The structure of the Roman military and government informed these values. Roman military service was expected for a citizen after 17. Honors given within the military were a product of one’s exploits on the battlefield.2 Many would even brashly rush to scale an enemy’s wall to receive the honors bestowed by a general upon the first.3 After military service, nobles could enter the cursus honorum, the competition for a series of consecutive offices dealing in finance, contracting, public works, and ultimately leading the military.4 Each was an elected office, so the public expression of one’s image was fundamental to employment in the highest offices. Within many military and republican systems, one can often see these ambitions for public glory, but the Roman Republic uniquely expanded these values through ancestor veneration.5
The unique aspect of the Roman value system, Glories of the Ancestors (maiorum gloria), greatly influenced the pursuit of those mentioned above, virtus and public ambition. We most easily witness a sort of ancestor worship by exploring funeral processions in the Republican period. When a great man died, a lifelike mask would be cast over his face and his body paraded into the Forum and set on the Rostra, where his oldest son would deliver a speech detailing his accomplishments to the masses present.6 During this ceremony, the family would gather the masks of the deceased’s ancestors and parade them in robes as befit the office of ancestors in their time.7 Romans ultimately judged the quality of a funeral by admiring the presence of its ancestral glory.8
After the ceremony, the family would return these death masks to the walls of their home. Such masks were a stimulus to Roman youth to hope to surpass the exploits of their family, for their family.9 The honor of one’s ancestors was such an essential part of an individual’s identity that these were those who went as far as associating their lineage with gods, unrelated heroes, or real ancestors whose exploits are entirely forged.10 A person’s bloodline greatly informed his public life. A nobleman in Rome would either attempt to compete with not only his contemporaries but also his ancestors. By the 2nd century BCE, the glories of old Rome had become legendary, so the exploits of later Romans could only be seen as attempts to transcend the founding myths of Rome.
1. Polybius, 6.1-4
2. Polybius, 6.39
3. Polybius, 6.39
4. Polybius, 6.12-13
5. Sallust The Jugurthine War 4.5 (Loeb trans., modified)
6. The Scipionic Epitaphs (from the translation of E.H. Warmington, Remains of Old Latin, vol. IV, Loeb Classical Library) (iv.) Lucius Cornelius Scipio
7. Polybius, 6.53-4
8. Livy, Periochae 48
9. Polybius, 6.53-4 & The Scipionic Epitaphs (from the translation of E.H. Warmington, Remains of Old Latin, vol. IV, Loeb Classical Library) (iii.) Publius Cornelius Scipio
10. Cicero, Brutus 62
To Livy, a Roman historian living at the end of the 1st Century BCE, it would have been impossible to deny the weight of fortune that had, in a few hundred years, propelled Rome to ascendency in the Mediterranean. The Romans were hegemons over the successors of Alexander, the marauding Gauls, and all other manners of people who had, at one point, been masters of the known world. Roman power thus colors Livy’s response to the question of whether Alexander could defeat the Romans: the former, a mythic figure of a people now humbled, while the latter was an unstoppable force. Living in his time, who could imagine Roman defeat?
Are Livy’s arguments credibile? He believed that Alexander was only one great king in whom the Macedonians had invested all their spirit, while Rome had innumberable generals to match his valor and personal glories.1 Livy also wrote on the logistical and manpower problems that any invading Macedonian army would face.2 Livy finally pivoted toward a discussion of each side’s power under arms, insulting the capability of Alexander’s eastern contingents while emphasizing Roman tactical flexibility.3 These three arguments can be summed up as command, logistical, and tactical.
One may argue that because Alexander’s empire fell apart at his death, his vulnerability during a Macedonian campaign would give the advantage to Rome, whose wars were never lost at the death of a commander. This belief however begs the question: would the chaos at Alexander’s death in peacetime be the same if he died during an Italian invasion? In other words, there’s little evidence to show if a common enemy would unite successor generals to promote a smooth transition of power, so it is wrong to assume either way.
Livy estimated Roman manpower at the end of the Samnite wars to be 250,000, because it could field 10 armies simultaneously against various threats on the Peninsula.4 Another adantage to Roman logistics was its relatively flexible definition of citizenship.5 This allowed the state in this period to draw upon greater manpower reserves than other contemporary powers.6 At the same time, Alexander would have to launch a fleet to carry his army from Greece to Italy, a notoriously dangerous passage.7 Livy’s argument about the logistical advantage going to Rome is correct.
Finally, we analyze the relative quality of these armies. The Romans would have just fought the Second Samnite War (326-304 BCE), leaving behind a veteran army in the process of reforming its organization.8 Alexander would at the same time lead a veteran army of world-conquering hoplites. Still, Livy claimed that Alexander’s veteran advantage would not be enough to overcome a newly reformed Roman army of Hastati, Pricipes, and Trarii. Pyrrhus of Epirus bested this Roman army on multiple occassions.9 The lesson of the Pyrrhic War, however, was that veteran armies were worn down and ultimately overcome by the weight of Roman numbers.10 The quality of an individual soldier may not be as important as Livy emphasized, but his assessment of Roman logistical organization is key to understanding its superiority. Alexander consistently drew upon local recruits to reinforce his armies in the east, but by the end of the 4th century BCE, it would be near impossible to bring consistent reinforcements in the hundreds of thousands from Iran to Italy.
It is impossible to determine how the quality of leadership would swing a contest of arms. It would also be wrong to assume how alliances between Greeks and Italians would pan out without a comprehensive assessment of individual and state motives in a geopolitical situation that doesn’t exist. Ultimately, we must pit the logistical abilities against the tactical. Roman organizational superiority would eventually surpass any advantage held by a Macedonian veteran army, but we still cannot definitively say how each state would reform its army, economy, or training in a protracted conflict.
Advantage, Rome. Sort of.
Sources:
In 243 BCE, the strategos of the Achaean League Aratus of Sicyon breached the citadel of Corinth and expelled the garrison of Macedonians. This effectively liberated the Peloponnesus from a Macedonian domination which had begun in 277 BCE with Antigonus II Gonatas.1 Contemporaneously, the Aetolian League emerged as a legitimate Greek power through its defense of Delphi from invading Gauls in 290 BCE.2 These were two entirely new political entities formed within the geopolitical atmosphere of Alexander’s successor states.
Since Alexander the Great’s death in 323 BCE, his generals had vied for control of his conquests, with Seleucus in the East, Ptolemy in Egypt, and the Antigonid dynasty ruling from Macedon in the North. Greece and her city states had been subject to competing propagandas of these great monarchies, with each offering a different sort to freedom to the subjugated Greeks.
Beginning with Antigonus II’s father, Demetrius King of Macedon, the successor states empowered tyrants in Greek city states and limited city-state autonomy to local decisions.3 Deciding succession to the Macedonian throne, a monarchy of which these city-states were a part, and maintaining judicial affairs were nominal powers of the people. Soldiers in both cases however elected their generals and managed the courts, and the monarch ultimately had the final say on justice.4
As a response to domination from these successor kingdoms, many Greek states began to coalesce, either willingly or by force, into leagues with a single standing army, common currency and measures, and shared laws.5 It was an attempt to balance the power of the successors with Greece’s own. The two most notable of these federations were the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues. These Leagues offered something different. Within the more prominent Achaean League, all free, military-age males were eligible for a say in the assemblies held four times a year. Polybius, a historian from the latter, claimed this federation to be the greatest freedom yet enjoyed by the Greeks.6
Decisions made within the Achaean League however would be its downfall. Cleomenes III of Sparta, which by now had began a programme of social and military reform, attempted to sway cities to him through land distribution and cancellation of debts. Many within the Achaean League were swayed by these ideals.7 As a response, Aratus called on the Macedonians to defeat this threat and restructure his subjugation to Pella. In 224 until 199, while the Achaean League had risen through its opposition to Makedonia, the two sides tightly coordinated their affairs, with the former operating under Antigonus and later his successor Philip V.8
The ultimate dissolution of the Leagues was a result of Roman destabilization in the region. The First Macedonian War (215 – 205 BCE), The Second Macedonian War (200 – 197 BCE), and the Roman-Seleucid War (192 – 188 BCE) each showed increasing Roman domination in Greece and Macedonia, and despite the Achaean League allying with Rome in 199 BCE, Achaean conflict with Sparta (149 – 146 BCE) led Rome to annex Greece.9
Ultimately, the rise of federalism in Greece was a natural and correct response to geopolitical pressure from Alexander’s Successor Kingdoms, but because the Achaean League could not fight its own wars, it tied itself to Macedon and later Rome, alliances which gave the latter a casus belli in its advance into Greece. Without geopolitical pressure, it is possible the federations could coalesce into the first true Greek state, but it is also these very pressures incentivized federation in the first place.
Sources:
Keywords are hyperlinked with Wikipedia articles for further reading
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